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I
gratefully accept the editors’ invitation to present a few reflections upon
Dr.  Garrison’s  Time  and  Money:  The  Macroeconomics  of  Capital
Structure. Since other contributors to this special issue of the Quarterly
Journal of Austrian Economics will critically discuss several aspects of the
book, I will not offer an exhaustive and systematic overview of the book’s con-
tent. After offering a few preliminary remarks, I will immediately pass on to
discussing in somewhat more depth two particular topics. One relates to what
I consider to be one rather questionable way in which Garrison’s construction
deviates from established modes of thought in Austrian economics; the other
relates to Garrison’s somewhat unbalanced treatment of the Keynesian and
Austrian paradigms, an aspect that I consider equally problematic.
Time and money constitute the blind spots of classical or standard eco-
nomics.1 Acknowledging this fact and taking it as a starting point for a renewed
reflection upon the themes and problems that were of central importance dur-
ing the important interwar debates remain as important today as ever. The
classical model was essentially one of barter. Keynes and Hayek had pre-
sented two related challenges to classical economics: the role of money and
the role of expectations.2 Hayek had been clearly implying that Say’s Law
applies  only  to  the  natural  economy  and  not  to  the  monetary  economy.
Garrison elaborates on an illuminating metaphor Hayek had suggested in
this respect, namely that “money by its very nature constitutes a kind of
loose joint in the self-equilibrating apparatus of the price mechanism which
is bound to impede its working—the more so the greater is the play in the
loose joint” (Hayek 1941, p. 408). As Garrison (p. 52) explains: “The Austrian
theory of boom and bust, which presupposes an essential loose-jointedness,
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2See also Cochran and Glahe (1999).identifies  a  systematic  misallocation  of  resources  that  could  not  possibly
characterize a tight-jointed system.”
Nevertheless, even as late as in his Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect
Hayek (1978, pp. 165–78) had refrained from treating the intricate questions
surrounding the role of expectations in any systematic or satisfactory man-
ner—while all the time recognizing their crucial importance.3 Garrison’s treat-
ment of these questions is outstanding, however, and must be considered a
highlight in the Austrian literature. For the first time, Hicks’s (1967) challenge
is satisfactorily dealt with (pp. 76–83).
Hicks had objected:
Hayek’s model does engender a process; some kind of lag (or lags) must
therefore be implicit in it. Where is the lag to be found? . . . If there are no
lags in market adjustment, the time-structure of production is irrelevant to
the Cumulative Process; for there will not be time, before equilibrium is
restored, for the structure of production to be changed. What then was
Hayek’s lag? (1967, p. 207) 
In Garrison’s construction there is no lag between earning and spending.
There is, however, some scope for the expansion of output in all stages of pro-
duction. As Garrison (2001, pp. 71–72) points out, the tug-of-war between
investors and consumers that sends the economy beyond its production pos-
sibility frontier pulls the Hayekian triangle in two directions, that is, the tri-
angle is being pulled at both ends—by cheap credit and strong consumer
demand—at the expense of the middle. But it is not strictly necessary to sup-
pose that both tendencies are not taking place simultaneously, that is, there is
no need to postulate the existence of a lag in this sense. The (limited) scope
for increased output at all stages translates into the scope for misallocations
among stages. There is a bias in the direction of investment that is directly
related to the particular manner in which the new money is injected. Credit
expansion implies an investment bias. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be simply assumed, much less taken for granted,
that in the face of a monetary expansion, an elasticity of expectations of zero
will apply. In this sense, the market process may—and often will—entail the
existence of a lag. Mises had already pointed out, responding to an objection
by Lachmann, that “without fairly elastic expectations there can be no crisis
of the Austro-Wicksellian type” (Mises 1943, p. 251).
Critics like Hicks (1967) had been assuming that, in the face of a mone-
tary expansion, an elasticity of expectations of zero applies. On the one hand,
Austrian theory can accommodate the insight that the answer to the question
of whether and to what extent the elasticity of expectations with respect to the
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3See Van den Hauwe (2001, p. 313).interest rate is greater than zero, is predominantly an empirical issue. On the
other hand, Austrians would typically want to argue that the assumption of
an elasticity of expectations with respect to the interest rate being greater than
zero is a plausible one. It is an implication of the very notion of “market
process” that the market works but that it does not work instantaneously. 
It should be pointed out that in other respects, too, Garrison succeeds in
going considerably beyond simply restating old debates. In chapter 5 of the
book he demonstrates the relevance of capital-based macroeconomics beyond
its application to the business cycle by discussing a variety of fiscal and regu-
latory issues (pp. 84–106). In chapter 6 Garrison modifies Hayek’s theory of
boom and bust by focusing attention on the risk premium component of the
interest rate and then retells it in a way that sheds light on a number of con-
temporary macroeconomic problems (pp. 107–22).
Garrison clearly brings out the essential difference between the Keynesian
and the Hayekian visions of the macroeconomy. At the most basic level this
difference relates to the respective judgments about the existence—or non-exis-
tence—of a spontaneous order at work. Whereas Keynes’s labor-based macro-
economics essentially leaves us with a macroeconomics of market failure,
Hayek’s intertemporal structure of production allows us to understand how it
is possible for a market economy to accommodate the trade-off between con-
sumption and investment.
In this framework it is obviously of crucial importance to trace out con-
sistently the consequences of changes in intertemporal preferences and their
implications for the intertemporal allocation of resources, that is, the implied
capital  restructuring  and  the  accompanying  auxiliary  labor-market  adjust-
ments. This brings me to my first critical reflection.
In Figure 4.3 on page 65 Garrison describes the auxiliary labor-market
adjustments  accompanying  a  capital  restructuring  following  changes  in
intertemporal preferences while referring to Hayek’s concept of a “family of
discount curves” (Hayek 1935, p. 80; 1941, p. 290) with which Hayek tracks
the differential changes in labor demand in five separate stages of production.
As Garrison rightly points out, increased saving has two separate effects
on labor demand. The two concepts at play are derived demand and time dis-
count. On the one hand, labor demand is derived demand: a reduction in the
demand  for  consumption  goods  implies  a  proportionate  reduction  in  the
labor that produces those consumption goods. On the other hand, like all fac-
tors of production in a time-consuming production process, labor is valued at
a discount: the reduction in the interest rate lessens the discount and hence
increases the value of labor. In the late stages of production, this effect is neg-
ligible; in the earliest stages of production, it dominates. The two effects
work in opposite directions—with the magnitude of the time-discount effect
increasing  with  temporal  remoteness  from  the  final  stage  of  production.
Together, they change the shape of the Hayekian triangle (p. 64).
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In  general  and  for  any  given  stage  of  production,  the  specific  factors
undergo  price  adjustments  and  the  nonspecific  factors  undergo  quantity
adjustments. Labor is here treated as a wholly nonspecific factor of produc-
tion, but one that has to be enticed by a higher wage rate to move from one
stage to another. Garrison assumes that initially the wage rate falls in the late
stage and rises in the early stage but that after the pattern of employment fully
adjusts itself to the new market conditions—with workers moving from the late
stage to the early stage—the wage rate returns to its initial level. 
Now this is a result that we would not directly expect. Any student of the
Austrian School, from Böhm-Bawerk down to Hayek, is familiar with the rea-
soning according to which the length of the period of production varies direct-
ly with real wages and inversely with the rate of interest.
Garrison assumes that labor is employed in all stages of production but
that it is neither so predominantly concentrated in the early stages of pro-
duction that the wage rate rises when the interest rate falls nor so predomi-
nantly concentrated in the late stages of production that the wage rate falls
along with the falling interest rate (pp. 66–67). He writes:
Of course, in particular applications, if labor is for some reason believed
to be disproportionately concentrated in early stages or in late stages, then
Figure 4.3 must be modified to show the corresponding change in the
wage rate. (p. 67)
However, after the capital restructuring, the proportional distribution of labor
among stages will have changed in the direction of a relatively greater con-
centration of labor in early, capital-intensive stages of production. This is one
reason why we would expect the wage rate to be higher after the restructuring
instead of returning to its initial level. 
This is also brought out by Hayek’s presentation from which it is clear that
the discounted value of the marginal product of the (nonspecific) factor will
necessarily be higher than it was before (Hayek 1941, p. 290).
Garrison is aware that his reckoning deviates from conceptualizations
found in the mainstream literature. Assuming constant returns to scale and
fixed proportions, and with no substitutability possible, Samuelson had dis-
cussed the fundamental trade-off relation between the wage and profit level in
terms of “the Factor-price Frontier”:
There is always a tradeoff between the wage and profit level: in the absence
of innovation both cannot go up; and whatever the pattern of innovation,
both cannot go down, since a simultaneous declining rate of profit and an
immiserization of the wage earner would be arithmetically impossible in
the stipulated technology. (Samuelson 1962, pp. 195-96)
What does it mean, in this reckoning, to stipulate that some capital goods—say
beta—are more “round-about, mechanized time-intensive” than an alternative
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This, and no more than this: alpha will be used at very high interest or
profit rates in preference to beta; but if the interest were lower . . . society
would let alpha wear out and put all its resources into the gross capital for-
mation of beta. (Samuelson 1962, p. 198)
Garrison recognizes that the pattern of change he depicts stands in con-
trast to the pattern that characterizes Samuelson’s analytics (p. 66). He  is
confident, however, that his conceptualization is consistent with Hayek’s (p.
65). Garrison’s claim that his reckoning is consistent with the one shown by
Hayek (1935, p. 80) seems questionable.
I will argue that in fact Garrison’s approach represents a rather radical
rupture from traditional and established modes of thought within Austrian
economics.
In The Pure Theory of Capital (Hayek 1941), a figure similar to the one
given in Prices and Production (Hayek 1935, p. 80) can be found. In the con-
text of a slightly involved presentation, Hayek there wrote:
The discounted value of the marginal product of the factor (or its price in
terms of consumers’ goods), indicated by the distance from the base to the
line ending at p1, will necessarily be higher than it was before. (1941, p.
290, emphasis is mine)
Before Hayek Böhm-Bawerk had arrived at the conclusion that “[t]he inter-
est rate in a given economy will rise in inverse ratio to the subsistence fund”
(1959, bk. 4, chap. 3, p. 365). 
However,  in  Böhm-Bawerk’s  numerical  examples  the  wage  rate  varies
directly with the length of the period of production and inversely with the
interest rate.4 It will be remembered that Stigler commented upon these pages
of Böhm-Bawerk’s Capital and Interest as follows:
This last section on the determination of the interest rate is his very best
economic theorizing. It is much more lucid, consistent, and penetrating
than the analyses of distribution, production, and discount of the future.
(Stigler 1994, pp. 226–27)
Thus, Garrison’s suggestion that after a capital restructuring “the wage
rate returns to its initial level” (ibid., pp. 64–65) is at odds not only with
Hayek’s reckoning of these matters but also with Böhm-Bawerk’s. 
It is this writer’s conjecture that the “anomalous” conclusion Garrison
reaches in Figure 4.3 (p. 65) with respect to the wage rate returning to its
initial level relates to a particular aspect of his construction: the attempt to
separate—at least conceptually—the “secular growth” aspect from the “changes
in intertemporal preferences” aspect when discussing economic growth. This
is a criticizable strategy. 
4In a similar sense, see Stigler (1994, p. 222).Garrison recognizes that “Historically, increasing wealth has typically been
accompanied by decreasing time preferences” (pp. 54–55). He adds, however:
The macroeconomics of secular growth provides a more realistic baseline
for analyzing particular changes in preferences or policies. In putting the
graphics through their paces, however, the secular component of growth
will be kept in the background. Changes in intertemporal preferences as
well as policy changes will be analyzed on the assumption that we begin
with a no-growth economy. With this simplifying assumption, the move-
ment of the macroeconomy from one equilibrium to another will some-
times involve an absolute reduction in some macroeconomic magnitudes.
Current consumption, for instance, might decrease while the economy’s
capacity to satisfy future consumer demands is being increased. In the
fuller context of ongoing secular growth, the absolute decrease in con-
sumption would translate into a reduced rate of increase in consumption.
More generally, the macroeconomic adjustments required by some partic-
ular parametric or policy change are to be superimposed (conceptually if
not graphically) onto the dynamics of the ongoing secular growth. (p. 55)
Apparently, Garrison holds the idea that there is no  necessary or concep-
tual link between economic growth and changes in intertemporal preferences.
Both may be conceptually and graphically separated, even if only for purpos-
es of exposition, and then again “superimposed.” 
Is it appropriate to conceive of this link as merely historical—that is, contin-
gent and accidental, so to speak—or is it itself a necessary, conceptual link? 
As it seems to this writer, Garrison’s suggestion works only in one direc-
tion. It may well be true that the notion of a progressing economy as such does
not  necessarily  presuppose  changes in  intertemporal  preferences,  that  is,
graphically speaking, a change in the shape of the Hayekian triangle. It seems
to be a necessary and sufficient condition for economic growth that saving
exceeds capital depreciation. In Dr. Garrison’s words:
Secular growth occurs without having been provoked by policy or by tech-
nological advance or by a change in intertemporal preferences. Rather, the
ongoing gross investment is sufficient for both capital maintenance and
capital accumulation. (p. 54)
On the other hand, however, it is more difficult to conceptualize that
changes in intertemporal preferences—and, more particularly a decrease in
time preference—can be conceived independently of the anticipated growth
of wealth over time. In the minds of the actors who change their intertem-
poral preferences in this sense, the intended increase of wealth over time is
necessarily part of the act, so to speak. Foregoing present satisfaction would
be pointless if not linked to greater satisfaction in the future.
As Mises wrote:
Saving, capital accumulation, and investment withhold the amount con-
cerned from current consumption and dedicate it to the improvement of
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in order to improve his own well-being and that of his family in the more
distant future. (Mises 1998, p. 840)
Even if no conceptual contradiction is involved in the notion of “secular
growth with assumed interest-rate neutrality,” it seems difficult to conceive of
a change in intertemporal preferences, in the sense that people become more
future-oriented, if unrelated to economic growth. 
People engage in lengthier production processes because these will lead to
the output of a larger quantity of consumption goods at some point in the
future than otherwise would have been the case.
This means that a change in intertemporal preferences—say, decreasing
time preferences—on the one hand, and economic growth or increasing wealth
over time on the other are not only historically and accidentally related, as a
matter of contingent fact. To the contrary they are essentially related and this
insight follows from the individual’s acting and choosing being taken as the
basic starting point of the analysis, that is, it is entailed by methodological
individualism.
This was clearly seen by Böhm-Bawerk and Mises. In Böhm-Bawerk we
find the idea that
one thing that can be stated with a reasonable degree of certainty is the
proposition . . . that as a general rule a wisely selected extension of the
roundabout way of production does result in an increase in the magnitude
of the product. It can be confidently maintained that there is no area of
production which could not materially increase its product over the result
obtained by its present method.5
Now according to Böhm-Bawerk the only basis of this proposition is the
experience of practical life; economic theory does not and cannot show a priori
that it must be so: “This observation . . . is based on experience, and only on
experience” (Böhm-Bawerk 1959, bk. 2, chap. 2, p. 83). As Stigler (1994, p.
201) adds: “the pragmatic proof lies in the fact that such methods would not
be used if they were not more productive.”
Why? As Böhm-Bawerk (p. 82) explains: “The disadvantage which attends
the capitalist method of production consists in a sacrifice of time. Capitalist
roundaboutness is productive but time consuming. It yields more or better
consumption goods, but not until a later time.” Böhm-Bawerk thus felt that a
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5Böhm-Bawerk (1959, bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 84–85). He also distinguishes two facts. One
is, that a lengthening of the roundabout methods of production results in an increased
quantity of the product; the other is that this increase begins to fall off at a certain point,
that is, the lengthening of the production period increases the product, but “in a lesser
ratio” or “in constantly decreasing proportion” (p. 85) than the relative increase in the pro-
duction period. more “time-consuming” process of production would not be chosen unless it
was more productive, that is, unless it added sufficiently more value to com-
pensate for the longer “waiting” required.
But then it can also be maintained, reasoning in terms of a variant of Say’s
Law, that the increased supply of (future) consumption goods will create its
own demand, and that therefore the real wage must be higher, at least in long-
run equilibrium. Actors forego present consumption and engage in increased
saving—and more roundabout production processes—now because this length-
ening of the production structure yields a greater amount of consumption
goods at some point in the future. 
People engage in lengthier production processes because this leads to out-
put of a greater quantity of consumption goods at some point in the future
than otherwise would have been the case. 
Thinking in terms of a variant of Say’s Law arguably this greater supply
must be matched by a greater demand. Therefore, it is difficult to see how it
would be possible that real wages—ceteris paribus—do not rise.6
Does this mean there exists a “necessary” or “apodictic” link between
increasing real wealth over time and the lowering of time preferences?
The answer seems to be in the affirmative in the following sense. If at a
moment in time, say T1, actors do not engage in a more roundabout process
despite the increases of product this would entail, and at a later moment, T2,
they  do  engage  in  this  process,  then  ceteris  paribus the  inference  that
intertemporal preferences have changed—in the sense of decreased time pref-
erence—between  T1 and  T2 seems  legitimate  since  ceteris  paribus such  a
change provides the best possible explanation of the actors’ decision now to
lengthen the production structure. At T1 the value of the increase of the prod-
uct that could be acquired by a lengthening of the structure of production was
not deemed sufficient to compensate for the longer waiting required, whereas
at T2 it was deemed sufficient. At T2 “the cost of waiting” no longer outweighs
the expected value of the increase of the product whereas at T1 it still did.
Therefore the conclusion seems warranted that the actors’ time preferences
have been lowered during the time period intervening between T1 and T2.
Inversely,  if time  preferences  are  lowered,  the  expected  value  of  the
increase in the product to be derived from some possible more roundabout
production process will now, at the margin, outweigh the implied “cost of
waiting,” whereas before it did not, and actors will, ceteris paribus, engage in
the lengthier production process. In the aggregate and over time this will be
accompanied by a higher wage rate. 
We can even go further. Even if the notion of secular growth with assumed
interest rate neutrality involves no conceptual contradiction, it is doubtful
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6Or more correctly, to the extent Say’s Law obtains. Say’s Law is a conditional propo-
sition, not an unconditional proposition.whether we would ever expect to encounter the corresponding phenomenon
in historical reality. As people earn more, they save more, but it does not fol-
low that the (social) proportion or ratio of consumption to saving and invest-
ment would remain exactly the same. The latter situation would rather seem
to be like a purely conceptual possibility, very unlikely to be met in historical
reality where it seems possible to occur only because of coincidence or acci-
dent. More likely we would encounter the situation characterized by a decrease
of what Rothbard has labeled the effective time-preference rate, that is, the
(social) proportion of consumption to savings-investment will be lowered. 
Garrison might object that his construction is still justified on the ground
that it serves convenience of exposition even if it may lead to somewhat coun-
terintuitive propositions, such as the wage rate returning to its initial level
after a capital restructuring. Nevertheless, this method is at odds with the tra-
ditional Austrian causal-realistic or causal-genetic method which recommends
that the logic of exposition should follow as closely as possible the logic of
how the phenomena themselves develop.
The causal-genetic method was characterized by Piaget in a somewhat dif-
ferent context: 
The ideal in causal deduction . . . is a deductive argument applied to the
production of phenomena. This argument is all the more satisfactory if
deductive steps correspond to the links between the subject matter of the
theory so that the order of the explanation reflects that of the antecedents
and consequences involved in the actual and temporal unfolding of events.
In other words, causal explanation will succeed insofar as each transfor-
mation involved in the relations between the objects corresponds to a
transformation or operation in the deduction, this last being copied from
reality. (Piaget 1968 p. 161) 7
My second fundamental criticism relates to a certain lack of balance in the
way in which Garrison treats the Austrian and Keynesian “visions” respec-
tively.
With respect to Keynesianism we are taught by Garrison (p. 185) that the
General Theory was ultimately an exercise in comparative institutional analy-
sis—or, as some economists would now say, in constitutional economics.
Let  it  be  recognized  first  that  the  quality  of  Garrison’s  discussion  of
Keynesianism is unsurpassed; almost to the extent that one is tempted to say
that, in some respects, his treatment of Keynesianism—in chapters 7, 8, and
9—is superior to his discussion of Austrian theory.
We thus learn that liquidity preference plays only a secondary role in
Keynes’s account of the business cycle—contra Krugman—but that an increase
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psychologism. Therefore, Piaget’s characterization must be interpreted, in the present con-
text, to have only metaphorical relevance.in liquidity preference that follows on the heels of a collapse in investment
demand may certainly be an aggravating development. The scramble for liq-
uidity is a secondary problem. The primary problem, which manifests itself
as  a  collapse  in  investment  demand  attributable  to  increased  uncertainty
aversion, is business pessimism. 
Neither is the issue of the stickiness or flexibility of the wage rate essen-
tial to an adequate understanding of the problem identified by Keynes. As a
theoretical matter the extent of the wage rate’s flexibility is very much a sub-
sidiary issue.
According to Keynes, cyclical unemployment is but one of the two com-
ponents of involuntary unemployment. The other is secular unemployment.
To fight this component of unemployment, policy tools will not suffice; social
reform is necessary. Fiscal policy is only the second-best solution to the pri-
mary problem.
However, involuntary secular unemployment is not unemployment in the
sense of Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis. The labor market clears.
Keynes’s secular unemployment is involuntary in that the market itself pro-
vides no effective mechanism through which individuals can eliminate the
fetish of liquidity or its consequences. The most fundamental component of
Keynes’s  involuntary  unemployment  is  thus  the  comparative-institutions
employment differential deriving from the decentralization of the investment
sector and the fragmentation of the saving-investment decision under capital-
ism. This fault would be absent from socialism—the latter term meaning cap-
italism minus its faults.
The comparative-institutional dimension of the Austrian approach, how-
ever, is largely left out of the picture.8 This blind spot in Garrison’s approach
becomes particularly conspicuous in chapter 11, where he sets out to compare
Austrian theory with monetary disequilibrium theory.
It has now almost become commonplace to state that the Austrian theory
is not a theory of depression per se but rather a theory of the unsustainable
boom (p. 240). Moreover according to this view there need be no direct rival-
ry between a theory of the unsustainable boom and a theory of depression.
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8On this issue, see de Soto (1998). In a recent article I insisted upon the difference
between Mises’s approach and that of the Rothbardians and argued that Mises’s policy rec-
ommendation fully agrees with the precepts of Hayek’s legal theory (Van den Hauwe 2000,
p. 585). I now realize that this view is not fully adequate. In fact it seems that Hayekians
and Rothbardians can reach similar conclusions when evaluating fractional reserve bank-
ing. Hayekians and Rothbardians also have in common a fierce rejection of positivism in
legal (or ethical) matters; moreover, both Rothbardians and Hayekians hold the view that
ethical or legal-theoretic questions are, in general, rationally decidable. Mises to the con-
trary, as is well known, explicitly rejected natural law. When discussing fiduciary media,
he even wrote:It is usual to reckon the acceptance of a deposit which can be
drawn upon at any time by means of notes or checks as a type
of credit transaction and juristically this view is, of course, jus-
tified; but economically, the case is not one of a credit transac-
tion. If credit in the economic sense means the exchange of a
present good or a present service against a future good or a
future service, then it is hardly possible to include the transac-
tions in question under the conception of credit. (Mises 1981,
pp. 300–01) 
But of course this view is questionable. Why should we accept that a wedge be driv-
en between the “economic” point of view and the “juristic” point of view, or between “eco-
nomic reality” and “juristic reality”? This view seems acceptable only if we at least implic-
itly accept a positivistic conception of the law, in other words, if the law is regarded only
from a de lege lata viewpoint and not from a de lege ferenda perspective.
9See also Horwitz (2000).
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Thus, according to Garrison, whereas Austrian theory may best account for
some nineteenth-century downturns and for the downturn at the end of the
1920s easy-money boom, monetarist theory may best account for the pro-
longed contraction that followed the initial downturn in 1929, which seems to
be wholly attributable to an unexpected and ill-advised monetary contraction
(pp. 228–29).
This fact, the argument runs, is not always clearly perceived. Dr. Yeager,
for instance, is perceived as taking the Austrians and the monetarists as offer-
ing rival theories of depression:
Yeager misidentifies the proximate consequence of credit expansion, tak-
ing the depression itself (rather than the intertemporal discoordination
and hence the inevitable crisis and downturn) to be the focus of the theo-
ry. It is true that the depression that is likely to ensue can be deeper and
longer-lasting than the initiating cause would imply. (p. 240)
The traumatic experience of the Great Contraction-Depression thus con-
tinues to haunt the economics profession.9 But what constituted this Great
Contraction? In that respect Friedman and Schwartz wrote:
The deposit-currency ratio has been of major importance primarily dur-
ing periods of financial difficulties. In each such period, the public’s loss
of confidence in banks led to an attempt to convert deposits into curren-
cy which produced a sharp decline in the ratio of deposits to currency and
strong downward pressure on the stock of money. The establishment of
the Federal Reserve System was expected to deprive such shifts in the
deposit-currency ratio of monetary significance by providing a means of
increasing the absolute volume of currency available for the public to hold,
when  the  public  desired  to  substitute  currency  for  deposits,  without
requiring a multiple contraction of deposits. In practice, it did not succeed
in achieving that objective. The most notable shift in the deposit-currency
ratio in the 93 years from 1867 to 1960 occurred from 1930 to 1933, when
the ratio fell to less than half its initial value and in three years erased the10According to monetary disequilibrium theory the initiating cause of the bust is
indeed a decrease in the money supply. The resulting monetary disequilibrium can pro-
voke a scramble for liquidity, intensifying the economy-wide disequilibrium. On the basis
of historical experience the old monetarists, especially Warburton, had already argued
that it is a collapse in M and not a fall in V that brings on depression. They recognize,
however, that people’s reaction to monetary disequilibrium may entail a fall in V—a scram-
ble for liquidity—which adds to the problems caused by the decrease in the money supply.
An excess demand for money puts downward pressure on all prices. For equilibrium to be
reestablished, all prices and wages have to adjust downward and can do so only on a
piecemeal basis. Complex and far-reaching interdependencies among individual prices
and  wages,  combined  with  the  who-goes-first  problem,  preclude  a  quick  and  smooth
adjustment in their general level. Quantity adjustments on an economy-wide scale, that is,
depression, characterize the period of slow and ragged adjustments in prices and wages
(p. 234)
As Garrison explains, the money supply is particularly susceptible to collapse when
policymakers are trying to cope with the final throes of a policy-induced artificial boom.
Intertemporal discoordination of economic activity, waning confidence on the part of the
business community, and indecision of the monetary authority can set the stage for a col-
lapse of the money supply. And the decrease in the quantity of money, which puts down-
ward pressure on all prices at the very time that systematic adjustments in relative prices
are underway, can make the depression much more severe than it would otherwise have
been (p. 251).
However, the whole scenario is context-specific, that is, it is not invariant under a
modification of the institutional context. The described effects would disappear under a
pure, that is 100-percent reserve, gold standard. 
11Under 100-percent reserves, shifts between deposits and currency would have no
effect on the total stock of money and banks could not alter the ratio of deposits to
reserves. The result would be to remove completely any instability in the stock of money
arising from these sources (Skousen 1996, p. 83). As Skousen explains:
Under a pure gold standard, banks would be required to main-
tain a 100 percent reserve, which would calm the fears the pub-
lic might have regarding the solvency of banks. Why would
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secular rise of three decades. Though the absolute volume of currency
held by the public rose, it did so only at the expense of a very much larg-
er decline in deposits, the combined effect being a decline of one-third in
the total stock of money. (Friedman and Schwartz 1993, pp. 684–85)
It  thus  seems  that  when  monetary  disequilibrium  theorists  complain
about the possibly disastrous effects of “excess” demands for money, what
they really have in mind, at least as an initiating cause, is a decrease in the
money supply as may result from a decline in the deposit-currency ratio.10
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the money stock fell by one
third. This monetary deflation occurred when the United States was on a gold
standard,  but  it  was  a  fractional  reserve-based gold  standard.  Obviously
under a pure gold standard such a monetary deflation would have been vir-
tually impossible. Under a pure gold standard, bank runs do not affect the
money supply.11 The world supply of gold and hard monetary reserves ispanicky depositors want to withdraw their money when the total
amount owned is stored safely in the bank’s vaults? And even if
they did withdraw their funds, the total amount of money would
remain unchanged. Under a fractional reserve system, convert-
ing deposits into cash can sharply curtail the money supply, but
under 100 percent backing, it can have no such effect. Thus,
bank  runs  would  have  no  impact  on  the  supply  of  money.
Moreover,  the  government  could  not  blunder  in  reducing  the
money supply because the monetary stock would consist entire-
ly of gold bullion and coins. (1996, p. 82)
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always increasing. It is, in fact, inconceivable that a monetary collapse could
occur under 100-percent reserves, as happened in 1929–32.
Now Garrison could point out that this insight is obviously not sufficient to
turn the Austrian theory into a theory of depressions. Being able to point to the
conditions  under  which  a  depression—and  in  fact  the  unsustainable  boom
itself—would be impossible, or at least very much unlikely, is not yet the same
thing as presenting a theory of depressions—or a theory of the boom-bust cycle.
Nevertheless, from a comparative institutions perspective, one would have
expected Garrison to have at least mentioned the theoretical link between
fractional reserve banking, unsustainable boom, and depression.
CONCLUSION
According to this writer Garrison’s Time and Money is precisely what it pur-
ports to be: an exercise in comparative frameworks.
Even if it should be recognized that the comparison of different theoreti-
cal  traditions  within  a  unified—graphical  and  conceptual—framework  may
require a number of concessions that are not without drawbacks—in the sense
that one or more of the theories thus compared may come out of the exercise
more or less mutilated—there can be no doubt that Garrison’s endeavor must
be  considered  a  success.  The  foundation  has  now  been  laid  not  only  for
renewed and fruitful discussion with different and related schools of thought
at the highest level of scholarly debate—an event without its equal since the
Hayek-Keynes debate during the first half of the last century—but also for fur-
ther research along Austrian School lines.
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